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In this paper wepresenta model in which a systematic banking collapse
is possible in a perfect foresight, general equilibriuni context.Our aim
isto determine conditions under which a collapse will eventually occurand
the timing of such a collapse. The collapse can occur endogenously,driven
by market fundamentals. Alternatively, it can becaused by a mass hysteria
which generates itself in reality. We also compare the assuniptionSand
implications of our model to the observable phenomenaof the 1930's.
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(716) 275-4320In this paper we will present a model in which a banking collapseis
possible in a general equilibrium context. Our aim is todetermine conditions
under which a collapse will eventually occur and the timing of such a collapse.
The methodology will be similar to that used in Salant and Henderson (1978),
Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1980); a banking collapseis a discontinuous
change in agentsT asset holdings which must occur in order to prevent
discontinuous price jumps when an institutional regime terminates.
The mod.l explored here assumes perfect foresight. Obviously, elements
of uncertainty would complicate agents' decisions and allow discrete price
jumps as new information arises. For instance, a stochasticenvironment is
necessary to address questions about excess reserve holdings,the ratio of
cash to demand deposits, or the level of bank equity (see e.g. Gorton 180).
Eventually, we will embed this model in a stochastic setting. However,it
appears to us that an essential aspect of banking collapses can be captured
in a perfect foresight model.
In section I we set up a model for the behavior of bank owners and
produce a sufficient condition for setting off a systematicbank collapse;
the condition amounts to a floor on the nominal interest rate. In sectionII
we choose some particular forms for asset and goodsdemand functions to serve
as an explicit example, which we solve, for the timingof a bank collapse.
The model which we use is essentially Patinkin's (1965, Chapters12.5—12.6)
full—employment macroeconomic model with a mechanical banking systemattached.
The differences are that expectations are of the perfect foresight variety
and that bank owners are explicitly profit maximizerswithin a constrained
environment.—2—
Of course, in constructing a model of systematic banking collapse,
any researcher, at least half-seriously, probably is attempting an explanation
of the enormous collapse of the great depression. Since we are not innocent
of such ambitions, we describe in section III both our model's points of
coincidence with the observable phenomena of the 1930's and its points of
divergence.—3—
I) A Behavioral Model for Bank Owners
In our model we will assume a real economy which is perfectly insulated,
except for wealth distribution, from the financial sector. In particular,
we assume that real output Y, the product of labor and capital, is fixed,
as are the inputs of labor and capital required to produce Y. The nominal
income of labor will be (1 —O)P(t)Vwhere (1 —0)is labor's share and P(t)
is the nominal price level. Capital receives OP(t)Y.
The construction of the machines which spew out Vwasfinanced in the
dim past partly through equity sales and partly through consol sales; each
consol promises to pay $1/period forever. From the nominal earnings of
capital, consol owners are paid first; any remainder is paid to equity
holders. In case of default on the coupon payments, we assume that ownership
of the machines reverts instantly to the bond holders; thus, the original
equity holders are wiped out and the bonds are converted to equities.
The number of consols in existence is B, and part of B is held by the
public with the remainder in the portfolios of banks. The consols are not
perfectly secure; if, for example, P(t) declines sufficiently OP(t)Y < B.
Then equity holders cannot meet their nominal obligations out of current
income; if this situation is expected to persist, equity holders default with
bondholders assuming ownership of the entire capital stock. For the real
private economy that is the end of the story.
Since banks are part of this system, we must consider bank behavior
in order to describe fully the asset markets. Throughout the paper we will
assume that the monetary authority is producing a deflation by destroying high—4—





R(t) is the amount of high powered money set aside as bank reserves, PB(t) is
the nominal price of a consol, Bb(t) is the number of consols held by the
banking sector, D(t) is the amount of demand deposits, and K(t) is the amount
of bank capital.
The banking sector is constrained by the rules of the game to pay on
demand $1 of high—powered money for $1 of its demand deposit liability. It
can do this either by drawing down its reserves or by liquidating a bond.
While a bank can default on this obligation only when it has no futher
assets, the bank owners can choose to liquidate the bank and pay off the
depositors at any time.
Sinceexit from the industry is costless, bank owners will never take
less then the real rate of return on their capital. We will assume that there
are barriers to entry and controls to interest payments on demand deposits
so that bank owners may make a premium rate of return from the bank business.2
To see how bank owners would behave in a deflationary situation let
us partition the banks' bonds into B(t), that quantity of bonds which equals
K(t) in value, and the remainder Bb(t), i.e. Bb(t) =B(t)+Bb(t).—5—






where PB(t)B(t) =K(t)and D(t) =R(t)+ PB(t)Bb(t).
For the purposes of the operation of the bank,K(t) is superfluous;
bank owners could remove it all from the bank byliquidating B(t), paying
themselves the proceeds, and purchasing B(t)
for direct inclusion in their
portfolios. The rate of return accruing tothe bank owners would be identical
in either case. Such an action need not precipitatea removal of demand
deposits as long as depositors areconfident that bank owners will make up
any capital loss on Bb(t).Since the continued functioning of thebank
depends only on the owners willingness to guaranteethe nominal value of
its liabilities and not on K(t), K(t) is notdeterminate in this model; so
we will assume K(t) =0without loss of generality.
In the course of a steady deflation, the ownersof equity in machines
will ultimately default on their nominal obligations;all earnings from
machines will accrue to consol owners. Therefore,real transfers will be
made to consol holders; in particular, banks,whose assets are primarily consols,
for a while will earn increasing real profits. liowever,from the moment of the
consol default, theconsolsbecome equity whose nominal price also declines as
tne price level falls.—6—
In addition to its reserves, a bank's assets after the bond default
consist of a number of claims to the earnings of the real capital stock of
the economy Bb(t), provided that the bank undertakes to maintain the nominal
value of these claims plus reserves. If the bank finds it unprofitable to
maintain these nominal values it will either go out of business or convert
Bb(t) into cash and hold 100% reserves. Whatisthe nature of the bank's
assets in terms of the returns accruing to the bank owners? After bond default,
a real payment of OY/B is made to each consol, so the total nominal payments
accruing to the bank areOP(t)YBb(t). However, the banks assets suffer a
capital loss of PB(t)Bb(t) in nominal terms which the bank owners must make
good by acquiring new bonds and adding them to the bank's assets. Denoting
the new bonds Bb(t), we must require PB(t)Bb(t) =— PB(t)Bb(t)in order to
carry out the bank's committment and maintain its operation. Thetotal




As long as these earnings are greater than the costs involved in operating
the bank's portfolio, the bank owners will maintain both the bank's position
as a lender and the nominal value ofthe bank's assets. Letting T(t) be
the bank's transaction cost per bond, we define cT(t)/PB(t) and assume




is the criterion for continued lending by the bank. Note that thequantity
on the left side of the inequality is the nominal interest rate, so as long
as the nominal interest rate is greater than c, the bank will hold consols.
In effect bank owners are holding a nominal asset because of their committments
to depositors; as long as it pays a sufficient interest rate they will hold
the asset. Note that the only other private nominal debt instrumentsare
held by depositors; so if the banks cease to hold consols, there will be
no private, interest—bearing nominal assets remaining in the system, a
phenomenon which we expect to observe when the nominal interest rate declines
sufficiently.
If at any time the nominal interest rate reaches c, bank owners become
unwilling to maintain their nominal bond assets. To preserve the nominal
value of these assets bank owners would have either to levy charges on
depositors or to add infusions of capital from their private holdings.
Since any bank which chooses to hold 100 percent reserves can avoid charging
depositors in order to subsidize these capital losses, depositors will remove
their funds from any bank which imposes such charges. Since maintaining banks'
nominal bond values from bankers' private assets would entail accepting less
than the real interest rate on their capital, bank owners will not follow this
course.
Therefore, with the passage of the nominal interest rate through e,
one of two possible events occurs. Depositors, faced with incipient capital
losses, run the bank and convert their deposits into direct holdings of bonds
and high-powered money, thereby destroying the banks.3 Alternatively, bank
owners run the bond market, converting their bonds into high-powered money
and extinguishing demand deposit claims. In this case, banks remain open but
the remaining demand deposits are backed by 100 percent reserves, In both cases-8-
demand deposits fall and the money stock collapses to the quantity of high-
powered money. Also, in both cases, bank runs are triggered by the profit
maximizing decisions of bank owners in a deflationarysituation.4
II)How to Determine the Time of a Banking Collapse
In this section we will construct a simple, linear model of the goods
and money markets of an economy, including a process to generate high—powered
money which is sufficient to provoke a banking collapse. Our goal is to
derive an explicit solution for the time of a banking collapse as a function
of the parameters of the model; so at least in some instances a banking
collapse can be viewed as a predictable phenomenon rather than as a sudden
outburst of mass hysteria.
The Asset and Goods Markets
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Equations (1) -(3)describe the goods market. Equation (1) states that the
logarithm of output supply, S is the constant y. Equation (2) describes
the logarithm of the demand for output, d which depends onand on the-9-
real rate of interest -i' Here i is the nominal interest rate, p is the
logarithm of the price level, andis the time derivative of p. Equation
(3) clears the goods market.
Equation (4) represents the demand for real balances, wheremd is the
logarithm of nominal money demand. Equation (5) states that the logarithm
of money supply equals the logarithm of the money multiplier, p, plus the
l+c1
logarithm of high-powered money, h. t is equal to the logarithm of
where 2 is the currency/deposit ratio and c is the fractional reserve/deposit
ratio. Both the money multiplier and the path of high powered money will be
assumed to shift at the instant of a banking collapse in a manner described
later. Equation (6) clears the money market.
We use equations (1), (2) and (3) to obtain
n0÷(n2-l)y
+I. (7)
Substituting from equations (7), (5), and (4) into (6) wederive5




Equation (8) has the solution
p(t) = exp( t)J(P(T) +h(T)-)exp(-T)dT.
(9)
The solution in (9) excludes the possibility of banking collapses which
generate themselves purely through expectations. For now we wish to consider-10-
only banking collapses which are driven by market fundamentals (Flood and
Garber (1980)). For the development of a predictable banking collapse
generated purely by mass hysteria" see below.
The Timing of a Banking Collapse
According to the discussion in section I, banks collapse, perhaps not
surprisingly, when they cease to be profitable and begin to make losses.
In our linear model, the condition for a bank's unprofitability is





We would like our example to emulate closely the major banking collapse
in the U.S. in 1933. To accomplish this we will first discuss some important
features of that episode so that they can be incorporated in our model.
According to Friedman and Schwartz (1963), at the beginning of 1933,
17,800 commercial banks were operating in the U.S. The collapse was evident
when, on March 6, President Roosevelt declared a three day bank holiday.
During the initial holiday, which was declared under a 1917 wartime measure,
the Emergency Banking Act was passed (March 9, 1933) allowing Roosevelt to
issue a proclamation continuing the holiday. Further, under the authority
of the Eiiergency Banking Act the President issued an executive order (March 10)
empowering the Secretary of the Treasury to license Federal Reserve Banks to
reopen. The reopening of licensed banks occurred from March 13 through
March 15.—11—
The reopened licensed banks faced a different environment following
the h.aliday than they had faced entering the holiday. Fewer than 12,000.
banks reopened with more than 5,000 unlicensed banks being unable to open
immediately and 2,000 of those never opening. The 3,000 banks that eventually
reopened were licensed gradually during the next year. The losses to
depositors during the collapse, whichamounted to $2.15 per $100 of deposits,
had contributed to an increased desired currency—depositratio on the part
of the non-bank public and, perhaps because of licensing,banks adopted a
higher ratio of liquid assets to loans than they had previously. Finally,
the stock of high—powered money began a rapid growth during 1933 and extending
into the 1940's.
We recognize that it would have been implausible for agents in the
early 1930's to have foreseen exactly all of the monetary changes of 1933—4.
However, given that previous banking collapses had resulted in radical
restructurings of the banking system, it would have been quite plausible for
agents to predict a discontinous change in the banking environment, conditional
on the advent of a banking collapse. Therefore, it is interesting to ask
how our model responds to these structural alterations, given that they are
forseen by agents. Ironically, it appears that such environmental changes,
conditional on a banking collapse, are exactly what is required to trigger
such a collapse. In the absence of such restructurings, the assumption that
a banking collapse occurs produces a logical contradiction, at least in this
model. See Appendix A for the development of this point.
While we focus here on three elements oUthe post—collapse structural
changes, any one of then alone would have been sufficient to trigger the
collapse. Specifically, to determine the timingofthe collapse, we examine—12—
the changes in 0and2, the change in the time path of high—powered money,
and the gradual re—opening of the unlicensed banks. In the main textwe
ignore the effects of the banking holiday itself; these we develop In
Appendix B.
Afterthe collapse both 0and2 rise above their previous levels to
* *
0>0and > 2. Therefore, the money multiplier falls:
E log[(l+Q*)/(Q*+*)] < P0log[(1+Q)/(Q-44)].
Prior to the collapse, which takes place at time z, we assume that
h(t) follows
h(t) =- 1eXt; > Q • (12)
After the collapse, we assume that h(t) follows
h(t) =w+- 1eXt+62(eO(t1)
-1), >. >0 (13)
where w is the logarithm of the fraction of high-powered money in banks
which remain open at z, the time of collapse. The final term in (13) may
reflect either new central bank injections after the collapse or the
remonetization of high-powered money in the closed banks as they are
gradually allowed to reopen. The high-powered money processdescribed in (13)
is basically the pre-collapse process with an additional growth term attached
to it.In addition, the presence of w in (13) indicates the extent to which
money is frozen in closed banks. Thus, (13) is general enoughto encompass-13-
cases in which the central bank makes no response to the collapse =
andin which no banks are closed (w =0).Equation (14) has the property
that the rate of change of h(t) in the instant after the collapse depends
on the time z of the collapse. Such a property is sufficient for a
determinate solution for z, as we will further explain below.




t < z (14)
m(t) = +w +- 1eAt+ (eO(t_Z) -1)t > z (15)
To solve for the time of collapse, we substitute the money path given
by (14) and (is) into the price level solution (9) and employ the condition
for banks' unprofitability. The solution for z should be interpreted as
the time span between the initial moment of the model, i.e. when h(0) is
set, and the moment of the collapse.
At any time t < z, the solution for price is
c8
p(t) =- + + + expXt} + (w+p1-0 -1)exp(t-z)}
(16)
Equation (16) results from straightforward, though tedious, integration.
Finite solutions require that X <and 0 <
The time derivative of (16) evaluated at t =zis
w+p1- ____Xz
(z) == _______ - +
aX-l
e . (17)




[ii- + 1 (cX-l) - ctO-1 whereE=
1
In order for the model to be interesting, we require E >1.Since





<0.Since 'ii< 0and aU—i <0,the positive term
-(w+i1--Li0)
a
cannot be sufficiently large to offset the two negative terms in
brackets. In addition, given the other parameters, A cannot be "too large."
Violation of these requirements would imply a deflation which is sufficient
to collapse the system prior to the beginning of the analysis.
Given the above restrictions we can determine the effects of parameter










All of these results satisfy intuition. A rise in the rate of reduction of
h(t), i.e., a rise of A or l' hasters the time of collapse. An increasein-15-
the floor value of the deflation ratealso hastens the moment of the
collapse. An increase in the percentagediscontinuity of the money stock
causes the collapse to occur earlier throughits effect on the
deflation rate. Finally, an increase in the post-collapsehigh-powered
money growth increases the timebefore the collapse.
A Problem in Solving for the Time of Collapse
In setting up the example above, we chose a special post-collapsehigh-
powered money supply process which allowed us
to solve explicitly for the time
of the collapse. In this subsection we will exposethe particular property
of our example's h(t) process which makes the determinationof z a solvable
problem.
To focus our discussion let us assume that thedemand for real balances
assumes the simple form:
m(t) -p(t)=-(t), >0. (20)
Again assuming that the collapse occurs at z, weknow that in the instant




where z indicates the instant before z. As soon asthe collapse occurs,
there is a discontinuity in the nominal money stockand a change in the
high-powered money creation process. Supposingthat after the collapse
high-powered money (and therefore the price level) growsindependently of
z at a constant rate B, the equilibriumcondition in the money market is-16-
m(z)-p(z)=-ct8 (22)
where z represents the instant after z.Since prices are Continuous,
p(z)=p(z);so subtracting (22)from(21) we find
m(z) m(z) -m(z)=-a(-O). (23)
If neither Am(z), the percentage collapse of the money stock, nor 8, the
constant rate of h(t) growth, depends on z, then there is not enough
information to determine z. Since in our previous example we assume that
(i-p1)isindependent of z, we must assume that the rate of inflation
immediately after the collapse depends on z. The money supply process in
(13) is sufficient to satisfy this requirement. However, any post-collapse
h(t) process which has a constant percentage growth rate must be excluded;
for in this case knowledge that p(z) =p(z)and that (z) =i isinsufficient
to determine z. We have not yet found an explanation for this difficulty;
however, in a more general model in which output and the real interest rate
are allowed to vary, r will depend on z.
A Collapse Generated by "Mass Hysteria"
We have developed above an example in which a banking collapse is driven
by market fundamentals. In this section we will provide an example in which
a collapse is generated purely by a belief that it will occur, i.e. a collapse
caused by "mass hysteria." Alternatively stated, a collapse can be caused
by the occurrence of a bubble of the type that always may arise in dynamic
rational expectations models. In our example "mass hysteria" will not
create a sudden, unanticipated collapse; rather, the collapse will be
predictable.—17-
We will construct this example around the simple money demand model
of equation (20). We will assume that the high-powered money supply process
h(t) is continuous and exogenous, but otherwise arbitrary; in particular,
it may even be growing at rapid rates. Before a collapse, behavior is such
that the logarithm of the money multiplier is i0; afterwards, it is Now
at time t all agents believe that at z .'tthe banking system will collapse.
The problem is to determine how agents' behavior will cause current and
time z prices to be set so that the belief will realize itself through the
=criterion. It happens that these prices are set by the materialization
of a bubble term in the p(z) solution, This bubble, reflecting agents'
certainty of a time z collapse, causes the collapse at z in a consistent manner.
The general solution for price in equation (20) is
p(t) =exp(t)ff(P
+h(T))exp(-T)dT +Aexp(t) (24)
where A is an arbitrary constant and p can be replaced byor1 depending
on whether t < z or t > z, respectively. If a collapse occurs at z, then








Setting t =zin (24), substituting the result for p(z) in equation (26),
and substituting the resulting p(z) in equation (25), we can solve for the
value of A for which (25) is satisfied at time z:
A =[p++ h(z)]exp(-z) -(p1
+h(t))exp(-T)dT. (27)
Thus, agents' beliefs that a collapse will occur at z will, in general, imply
that a price level bubble will exist after z. Depending on the nature of the
h(t) process for t > z, A may be either positive or negative.
We have shown how a belief in a collapse at z can cause equation (23)
to be satisfied through the appearance of a post-collapse bubble. Next we
must demonstrate that the criterion for a collapse at z, (z) =Tt,is
also satisfied merely by this belief; i.e. we must show that the belief in
the event generates the event. Again, from (20),
— 1 1
p(z )= — p(z)- + h(z)). (28)
From (24) and (27) we know what p(z) must be to satisfy the market clearing
conditions just before and just after the collapse, i.e. to satisfy equation
(25). Substituting this p(z) into (28, we find that (z) =u.The bubble
term of the magnitude A given in equation (27) then causes the criterion for
a collapse at z to be satisfied. Finally, at any time t prior to the collapse,
the solution for the price level is
p(t) = exp(t)J (Po +h(iflexp(-T)dT +p(z)exp((t-z)). (29)-19-
In summary, the current price level is uniquely determined by the
condition that (z) =it.This latter condition is determined by the
appearance of the post-collapse bubble which causesthe market clearing
conditions to be satisfied just before and just after the collapse. Real
balances change discontinuously at the time of the collapse because of a
postulated behavior shift (or regime switch) which occurs because banks
can no longer profitably lend.
III) Relating the Model to the Great Contraction
We now wish to compare the assumptions and implications of our model
to some observable phenomena associated with the Great Contraction. Since
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) have written a massive volume describing these
phenomena, we will not dwell on the details. Rather we will provide references
to relevant sections or charts in F&S. In this section, we will compile
a list of the points of coincidence and points of divergence of our model
from the observable data for the depression. In some cases, we will discuss
how the model may be extended to encompass phenomena which either are at
variance with its implication or are not implied by the model. In other
cases, we will discuss how the data, or at least interpretations of the
data, may be altered so that they may encompass the model. Almost all of
the cited evidence and charts are taken directly from Friedman and Schwartz.
1) Both a stock market crash and a steady decline in equity prices until
the final banking panic occurred in the depression, as F&S's Chart 29
indicates. While our model contains explicitly an equities market only
after the bond default, a more general model which determines simultaneously
equity prices, bond prices, and the price level can readily be formulated,-20-
though analytical solutions for z are more difficult to derive. Thus, an
equities price can be constructed; and this price should fall continuously
with the deflation and transfer of real wealth to the bondholders. The crash
can be built into the model only if we relax the perfect foresight assumption
and assume that the deflationary high—powered money policy is suddenly and
unexpectedly imposed, which would certainly cause the stock market to crash.
On this change of assumptions, see footnote 1.
2) The depression is a period during which there were defaults andcapital
losses on assets held by banks, as implied by our model.However, our
model indicates that for a while before the bankingpanic banks earn increased
real profits.
3) The nominal interest rate fell to low levelsduring the contraction
as indicated by F&S's Charts 29 and 35. The returns on short—term U.S.
securities fell continuously even after the bank collapse. Theyields on
Baa bonds rose to their highest levels in 1932, but theseyields are conditional.
Since many of the bonds were defaulted, the expectedyield was probably lower.
4) From F&S's Charts 16 and 28, it appears that deflationwas accelerating
until the final banking collapse, though thismay be in the eye of the
beholder.
5) There was a switch from negative to positive rates of inflationat
the end of the crisis, as indicated in F&S's Chart 37. Thiswas associated
with the simultaneous switch to positivemoney stock and high—powered money
stock growth rates immediately after the collapse. This is indicatedin
Charts 34, 37, and 38.
6) There was a low overall capital loss to depositors after thecollapse,
so that incipient losses seem to have been enough to collapse thesystem.-21-
See F&S's discussion on capital losses from pp. 437—441 and especially their
use of the example of the Bank of the United States, pp. 308—313.
7) There was an increased regulation of banks immediately after the final
collapse. Controls on the kinds of assets banks could hold were imposed
immediately (see F&S, p. 443, note 21). The power of the Federal Reserve to
alter reserve requirements was immediately enacted, though not immediately
employed (F&S, p. 447).
8) There was a sudden, large—scale destruction of money at the time of
the final banking panic, as indicated in Chart 16, 31 and 34. There was no
comparable discontinuity in the price level at the same moment, seecharts
16 and 37.
9) Real income did not remain fixed; rather, it dropped precipitously
during the depression. See F&S, charts 16 and 28.
10)High—powered money was static before 1930; during 1930, it declined
slightly; and after 1930, it increased. See F&S, charts 23 and 32. This
removes the forcing function from our model and requires that we seek some
other factor which drove the deflation.
The story which we will tell concerns the holding of U.S. currency
by foreigners. If currency substitution were a strong force during this
period and if foreigners were increasingly demanding U,S. currency, then
equation (12) would represent foreign demand by the term 1eXt, which is
subtracted from the static high-powered money supply, Equation (12)
can then be interpreted as the U.S. economy's supply of high-powered
dollars.
This story avoids the problem of a static, measured high—powered money
stock, but how plausible is it? Reference to F&S's Chart 32 indicates that
foreign demand provides at least a possible forcing function for the deflation.-22-
Whiletotal high—powered money is probably measured accurately, there is no
way to determine the whereabouts of its components otherthan of reserves
and vault cash. High—powered money was essentially constant from 1925—1931;
of the $7 billion in high—powered money, $4—l/2 billion consisted of Federal
Reserve notes, Treasury currency, and gold coin and certificates. Foreigners
were certainly holding some of this cash abroad, but the magnitudes cannot
be determined.
However, during the hyperinflationary period of the early 1920's,
agents in the hyperinflating countries directly held foreigncurrencies on
a large scale, the dollar being a principal among them. Some estimatesof
the extent of this foreign currency holding were made. Bresciani—Turroni
(1937), (p. 345), mentions that 1.5—4 billion goidmarks ($357—$952 million)
in foreign currencies and exchange were held in Germany in the autumn of
1923. Graham (1930) reports (p. 73) an estimate of 2—3 billion goldmarks
($476—$7l4 million) in foreign currencies in Germany. Walre' des Bordes
(1924) cites (p. 192) a League of Nations estimate that there were 1 billion
Swiss francs ($189 million) worth of foreign currency in Austria in May, 1921.
If half of these currencies were dollars, then at the outside some $500 million
dollars of U.S. currency were held in Germany and Austria. In addition
there were simultaneously hyperinflations in Hungary, Poland and Russia;
presumably foreign currencies were also held there. However, the currencies
held in Germany and Austria alone may have comprised as much as 1/13 of the
$6.5 billion in U.S. high—powered money and 1/9 of the cash in circulation
in 1923.-23-
This discussion indicates that there is some loose evidence that
foreigners had demanded large quantities of U.S. high—powered moneyas
recently as 6 years before the onset of the depression. Possibly,the
turbulent state of European currencies in the late 1920's caused them to
demand dollars on a large scale once again.
That data do not exist to refute or support this conjecture may make
it more or less believable. However, it does provide a monetary impetus
which, when combined with the fixed supply policy of the Federal Reserve,
is sufficient to set off a banking collapse.
11)While the deposit—currency ratio and the deposit—reserve ratio both
fell after each banking crisis, the changes were not obviously sudden.
Rather these ratios both fell steadily both before and after each crisis.
See F&S's Chart 31. After the final collapse, the deposit—reserveratio
continued to fall, but the deposit—currency ratio started to rise. See
F&S, Chart 38.
12)Banks paid interest on deposits and, at the end of the 1930'smade
charges on them. See F&S, pp. 443—445, p.504. It isdifficult to determine
the extent of the interest payments from F&S's discussion, which seems to
be concerned with inter—bank deposits. In any case interest paymentsto
deposits can be worked into our model fairly easily.-24-
13)There was not one banking crisis; rather there was a series of domestic
banking panics culminating in the Banking Holiday of 1933. See for example
F&S's Chart 31 for the time intervals between these crises. In addition,
Summer, 1931 brought the central European banking collapses, followed by
runs on the Reichsmark and the British pound which forced Germany and Britain
from the gold standard.
If we assume that the deflationary high—powered money policy remains
in effect until the final collapse, our model can encompass such cascading
bank collapses. Each collapse in the sequence requires a discontinuous
change in the money stock; such discontinuities will arise if, conditional
on a collapse, the money multiplier declines discontinuously at the moment
of the collapse. For instance, if, after each collapse in the sequence,
agents' behavior causes the deposit—reserve ratio and the deposit—currency
ratio to jump to even lower levels, then the economic system will surely
generate the sequence of collapses. The post—banking crises movements of
the deposit—currency and deposit—reserve ratios depicted in F&S's Chart 31
are consistent with this explanation.—25--
EARLYYEARS OF FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
CHART16
Money Stock, Income, Prices,andVelocity, in Reference
Cycle Expansions and Contractions, 1914—33
The net national product figures shown for 1917—19 modify Kuznets' esti-
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CHART28
Prices, PersonalIncome, and Industrial Production, Monthly,
1929—March 1933
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Common Stock Pikes, Interest Welds, and Discount Ratesof
FederalReserveBank a-F New York, Monthly, 1 929.—March 1933
1929 ¶930
SouiC Common stock pric. Ind.z, Standard and Poor's, as publlshsd In
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for Chart 35.THE GREATCONTRAcr!ON
CHART 31
The StockofMoney and Iti Proximate Determinants, Monthly,
1929—March 1933
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CHART 32
High-Powered Money, by Assets and Liabilities of the Treasury



































Bank deposits at Federal Reset
—
I














1929 1930 1931 19.2 1933
NOTE F.d.rd Res.rv. not.,, Tr.asury curr.ncy, and gold c&n and c,rttfieats, or. outsld.
Ii. Tr.asury and P.d.rul R.s.rv. Bo,iki.





















II II I I iiiii I
Sicorder,ivi r.R. rtso,
bosb.ngIsowsi bond boMinq cna.t go'd piwchcus cris$
•• •£II I I i •• ••itliiiii-32-
NEWDEAL CHANGES
CHART34
Alternative Money Stock Estimates, February 1933—June 1935
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Jan.-F.b. only, monthly data unavailable thereafter on a comparable bas, Basic yl.ld of 40- to
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federal R.jsr,. Bulletin, Dec. 1938, p. 1045; Feb. 1940, p. 139. Commercial paper, lfj,Jorkcl
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Changing Relations Among Interest Yields, 1928—39
Commercial paper, 4-to-6 month34.-
CYCLICALCHANGES, 1933—41
CHART 37
MoneyStock, Income, Prices,and Velocity, PersonalIncome
and IndustrialProduction,in Reference Cycle Expansions
andContractions, March 1933—December 1941
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IV) Conclusion
Oneofour goals in this paper is to show that banking collapses
can be predictable phenomena, produced by an economy's dynamicworkings when
faced by a deflationary policy. We have demonstrated that most of the
important events associated with banking collapses canbe produced by an
economy devoid of random elements and that the collapse canbe predicted,
perhaps far in advance.
In addition, we have attempted to breathe some empirical life into
our simple model by comparing it to the events of the depression.Either
our model or simple extensions of it can capture manyof these events. The
only aspect of our model which diverges from the depressionin an important
way is the deflationary forcing function; high—powered moneywas static
rather than declining. It is difficult either to verify or to refute our
suggestion that foreign demand for U.S. currency may havebeen sufficiently
strong to produce a deflationary forcing function;the data seem to be
unavailable. However, it may well be worth the investment to try to determine
who was holding U.S. currency during this period.-37-
NOTES
1 The monetary authority may have maintained this deflationary policy
since the beginning of time, or it may have suddenly imposed the policy.
In the latter case prices can fall discontinously to the extent that the
new policy was unanticipated; specifically, there may be an immediate
collapse of the equities market price. However, there may be a terminological
problem in referring to this situation as one of "perfect foresight".
One may think of the policy switch as a probability zero event, which, once
having occurred persists into the indefinite future with certainty. Alternatively,
one may explicitly assume a stochastic model and state asset demands in
terms of expected values of future prices. Since in a model with random
future regime switching this assumption greatly increases the analytical
difficulty with no increase in insights, we avoid the complication here. See
Flood and Garber (1981 )foran explicit analysis of such a problem.
2 If there were free entry into the banking industry, the banks should
earn no more than the market real rate of return on their original capital;
otherwise, more firms would enter the industry. Since bonds earn the real
rate of return in the model, this would force reserves to equal the amount
of demand deposits or require interest payments on demand deposits.
3 Of course, the bank could maintain its operation even if it were
insolvent, as long as the public were willing to accept its checks at face
value. In order to trigger the run at the moment of incipient insolvency,
all that is needed is an agency which will close the bank and force liquidation
if its assets decline far enough below its liabilities. Such a closure
would cause a discontinuous decline in the value of deposits, thereby forcing
a run to occur at the time of incipient insolvency.-38-
4 However, for a collapse to occur in a logically consistent manner,
the post—collapse banking environment must be different from the pre—collapse
environment. The change is imposed in our model. in the form of a different
xoney multiplier or of a different monetary base. If a collapse occurs,
agents desire higher ratios of currency to deposits, bankers require higher
ratios of reserves to deposits. and the central bank destroys some monetary
base. -
InAppendix A, we demonstrate how a logical inconsistency arises when
it is assumed that a banking collapse occurs, based on our criterion, in
the absence of such a post—collapse environmental change. To understand
the problem, the reader should first read section II. Ironically, the threat
of a more restrictive banking environment in the presence of a collapse,
together with the deflationary high—powered money policy, is sufficient to
generate the collapse in a logically consistent manner.
5 Equation (2) serves little purpose other than to fix the real interest
rate at some constant level. If the reader prefers a little movement in his




Substitutingfor(m-p) from (4) in equation (2') and solving for the nominal
interest rate, we derive
no +fl3)'O
+'2- +
i= +( )i5 (*) n +n n
1113 1113
Subtractingfrom both sides of (*),wefind that the real rate of interest
isa linear function of the inflation rate. However, the remaining steps in
the solution for the time of the banking collapse are the same as in the body
ofthe paper.-39-
Appendix A
In this appendix we will demonstrate a logical inconsistencywhich
arises if we assume that a banking collapse, based onthe criterion of our
model, occurs with no post—collapse change in the bankingenvironment. Thus,
there will be no post—collapse shift in the high—powered money processor
in the currency—deposit ratio. The reserve—depositratio may take any value
desired by bankers above the legal minimum.
We will refer to Figures I, II, and III to make our argument.In
Figure I we plot the path of the logarithmof the price level against time;
in Figure II, we plot the nominal interest rate againsttime; and in Figure III
we plot the logarithm of the money stock againsttime.tc.
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Let us assume that the rate of high—powered money destruction issuch
that a banking collapse occurs at time z, i.e. the banks find it unprofitable
to continue their operation as lenders and switch to a 100% reserveratio.
A collapse entails a discontinuous destruction of the money stock at the
moment of the collapse, so that rnwould follow a path like ABCD in
Figure III. Since there is a discontinuous reduction of money at z,the
path of pwill decline at a much more rapid rate prior to z than after z;
i.e. there will be a kink in the price path at z. See Sargent and Wallace
(1973) or Boyer and Hodrick (1980) for the development of this result.
Our criterion for a collapse at z requires that the nominal interest
rate begins to pass through at time z. Since i is the constantreal rate
of interest plus the left—hand time derivative of the Pcurve at
time z equals minus the real interest rate.
At the instant of the collapse jumps discontinuously upward, i.e.
it becomes less negative. Therefore, the nominal interest rate jumps
discontinuously above e to i*. But with the higherinterest rate, the banks
suddenly find it profitable to make loans again. Since required reserves,
the currency—deposit ratio, and the monetary base are unchanged justafter
the collapse, banks will expand their loans and the total money stock exactly
to the levels which prevailed just prior to the collapse.But then there
can be no discontinuity in the path of m nokink in the p path,
and no discontinuous shift in 1. Therefore, there can be no collapse at z.-41-
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